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The risk that  the debtor country  will default on its external  debt
may  be significantly  decreased  by  a debt-reduction  operation,  by
a reduction  in international  interest  rates, and by changes  in the
country's willingness  to pay.
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The price of debt on the secondary  market  Their  model also emphasizes  that a debt-
reflects  the risk that the debtor  country  might  reduction  operation  may lead to a significant
default on its external  debt.  increase  in the price of debt on the secondary
market. This effect appears  to be linked to the
Using  the option-pricing  theory,  Chesney  initial  stock of extemal  debt, as suggested  by the
and Morisset  identify  the factors  that influenced  "debt overhang"  hypothesis.
the risk of default  in six highly  indebted  coun-
tries from 1986  to 1990.  Finally,  Chesney  and Morisset  show empiri-
cally that a country's  willingness to pay is
In particular,  they provide  a measure  of the  significantly  influenced  by changes  in indicators
debtor  countries' willingness  to pay. They  of the country's ability  to pay (for example,  by
identify  the parameters  of the stochastic  process  an increase  in reserves  or in GDP growth),  and
followed  by this variable,  so this approach  can  by exogenous  events  such as the increase in
be used to prdict the future  price of debt.  commercial  banks' loan reserves  in mid-1987  or
the Brady Plan announcement  in 1989.
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at the Conference on Economic Developement  (Champery (CH),  March 1992).1.  The  major  differences  between  domestic  and international  debt  is
that  the  former  are legal  obligations,  enforceable  in courts  and  that  domestic
debtors  who cannot  meet their  obligations  have the  option  of filling  for
bankruptcy. In  contrast,  repayment  of international  debt  depends  largely  on
the  borrower's  beliefs  about  the  lender's  resolve  to  penalize  a disruption  of
repayment. Along  these  lines,  three  simples  rules  can  be distinguished:
First,  the debtor  country  will reimburse  its  debt  if the  payment  required  to
offset  the  penalties  - applied  in case  of default  - is  higher  than the  debt
itself. Second,  the  debtor  country  will  only  pay a fraction  of its  total
debt-service  if  the  payment  required  to offset  the  penalties  is  positive  but
lower  than  the  face  value  of the  debt.  The  third  possibility  is that  the
debtor  country  will call  a total  default  on its  external  debt  because  the
economic  and  political  benefits  in case  of full  default  would  be higher  than
the sanctions  applied  by the lenders.
2.  The  major  problem  related  to this  approach  is  that the  willingness
to pay  and  potential  penalties  are  unobservable  variables. The idea  in this
study  is to use the  information  on the secondary  market  of the  price  of debt
to obtain  a measurement  of these  variables. Indeed,  the  market  value  of the
debt  can  be viewed  as the  result  of the  simple  rules  described  above. The
country  examines  the  alternative  to  pay according  to the  values  of its
potential  payments  and its  willingness  to pay,  thereby  determining  the  market
value  of the  debt.  Using  the  option-pricing  theory,  this  study  identifies
explicitly  the  factors  driving  the  price  of debt  on the  secondary  market  :  the
willingness  to  pay, the  interest  rate,  the  maturity  and  the  volume  of debt.
3.  The approach  is  applied  to six  highly  indebted  countries  -
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico  Poland  and  Venezuela  - in order  to measure
their  willingness  to pay over  the  last  four  years.  The results  indicate  that
the  willingness  to  pay were quite  volatile  in all  countries.  Interestingly,
the  model  provides  ue the  probability  of full  and  partial  default  of the
debtor  countries. Moreover,  the  approach  can  be used  to forecast  the  price  of
debt.  The  comparison  between  the  observed  and  the  estimated  price  of debt for2
the  first  quarter  of 1991  indicates  that  the  model  predicts  relatively  well
the  future  price  of the  debt.
4.  The  study  examines  the  consequences  of three  different  policies  on
the  price  of debt: (i)  A reduction  in the  existing  stock  of debt, (ii)  an
extension  of the  maturity,  and (iii)  a reduction  in the  interest  rates. If
the  impact  of a debt-reduction  was ambiguous  in  the theoretical  model,
reflecting  in that  sense  the  opposing  views  which  currently  exist  in  the
literature,  all simulation  results  indicate  that  the  effect  of a decline  in
the  stock  of external  debt  would  increase  the  price  of debt on the  secondary
market.  Specifically,  the  model  demonstrates  that  this  positive  impact  is
closely  related  to the initial  levels  of debt  and  of the  willingness  to  pay of
the  debtor  country. While  the first  point  indicates  that  the "debt  overhang"
is more likely  to  be reduced  if the  existing  debt  is large,  the  second
suggests  that the  benefit  of a debt-reduction  operation  will  be greater
whether  the  debtor  country's  willingness  is  high  enough  to attract  new
financing.  Concerning,  the  imqjact  of an increase  in  maturity,  the  model
indicates  that  such  policy  will generally  lead  to a decline  in the  price  of
debt  because  the  willingness  to pay is likely  to decrease  over time.  In
contrast, the  price  of debt  is positively  influenced  by a decline  in the  rate
of interest.  The  dramatic  decline  in the  Libor  rate  explains  to a large  extent
the  higher  prices  of debt  observed  on the secondary  market  since  the  beginning
of 1991.
5.  In the  final  part of the  study,  the  responsiveness  of the
willingness  to pay to three  classes  of factors  has  been estimated. First,  we
tested  the  hypothesis  that  the  willingness  to  pay are influenced  by the  debtor
country's  capacity  to  pay.  Identification  of such  domestic  influences,  if
any,  on the  willingness  to pay  may confirm  that  debtor  countries  economic
situation  is  partly  reflected  in  the  price  of debt.  Second,  the  impact  of
particular  events  on the  willingness  to pay  may  be significant  since  the
number  of potential  buyers  and sellers  are  small  in the  secondary  market.
Third,  since  the  economic  conditions  existing  in the  creditor  country  can
influence  the  bargaining  process  between  the  debtor  and the  creditors,  we3
estimated  the  impact  of changes  in the  creditor's  behavior  on the  willingness
to  pay  of the  debtor  country.
The  major  policy  conclusions  of the  exercise  are the  following
(1) A debt-reduction  operation  is likely  to influence  positively
the  price  of debt  on the  secondary  market. Particularly,  if the
existing  stock  of debt is  high  and if the  environment  is favorable
enough  to  attract  new  financing.
(2)  An increase  in GDP  of the  debtor  country  may exert  a
significative  impact  on the its  willingness  to  pay external  debt.
An improvement  in economic  conditions  of the  debtor  country  can
therefore  enhance  payments  of interest  on external  debt.  This
suggests  that  a strategy  relying  on debtor  country's  economic
growth  may be more efficient  than  the implementation  of  penalties
for  default.
(3)  Changes  in creditor's  behavior  may  affect  the  debtor  country's
willingness  to pay.  While  the  Brady  announcement  produced  a
favorable  impact  on the  willingness  to  pay, the  influence  of
announcements  regarding  loans  reserves  by commercial  banks  was
negative.4
Introduction
The recent  literature  on country  risk  emphasizes  that  a country's
prospect  of paying  its  future  debt-service  depends  essentially  on its
creditworthiness,  which  refers  not  only to a country's  ability  but also  to its
willingness  to  pay.  In an important  paper,  Gersovitz,  Eaton  and Stiglitz
(1986)  argued  that  countries  virtually  always  have sufficient  resources  to
repay  their  loans  2.  Furthermore,  temporary  liquidity  problems  should  not
cause  payments  problems  either,  so long  as the  problem  is correctly  perceived
by the  creditors.  Creditors  could  simply  make  additional  temporary  loans  or
lengthen  maturities  to  overcome  a temporary  liquidity  problem.  Consequently,  a
lack  of creditworthiness  is  more than  just  a problem  of insolvency  and
illiquidity. The  main  problem  faced  when attempting  to assess
creditworthiness  is the  measure  of the  country's  willingness  to repay  which  is
not  directly  observable.  Indeed,  one should  be able  to identify  the  internal
or external  enforcement  mechanisms  which  reward  a country  for  paying  its  debt
and  penalize  it for  default.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to develop  a simple  approach  to measure  the
willingness  to pay  of a  number  of debtor  countries.  To the  extent  that  the
secondary  market  of the  price  of debt  is efficient  (in  the  sense  that  all  new
information  is  quickly  assimilated),  the  price  of LDCs  debt reflects  the
present  value  of rationally  expected  future  debt-service  payments.  Moreover,
as suggested  by Borensztein  and  Pennacchi  (1990),  the  price  of debt should  be
related  to an unobservable  variable  that  determines  debtor  country  repayment
to  private  banks.  This variable  expresses  the  willingness  to pay  of the  debtor
country  and should  be the  result  of a complicated  bargaining  process  which  is
itself  affected  by factors  such  as political  and  economic  shocks.  By using  the
option-pricing  theory  we are  able  to identify  this  variable  and  to  provide
some  estimate  of its  value  for  a sample  of highly  indebted  countries  over  the
1986-1990  period.  In  addition,  since  the  parameters  of the  stochastic  process
2"In  a  formal sense, insolvency  is not really an issue in lending to
foreign  governments.  The  debt  of a country  in almost  all instances  is less
than  the  value  of the  assets  owned  by national  and  government  of the country"
(p.484).5
followed  by this  variable  are  identified,  this  procedure  can  be used  to
predict  the  evolution  of the  price  of debt.
The  main advantage  of this approach  is that the  country's  risk  of
default (reflected  in the  price  of debt)  is  defined  without  any  a priori
assumptions  regardir3  the  variables  which  affect  the  country's  willingness  to
pay. In such  a case,  it is interesting  to determine  the  principal  factors
exerting  a significant  impact  on the  willingness  to  pay.  From  a policy
perspective,  it is important  to ask if  a change  in GDP  growth  or in
international  reserves  of the  debtor  country  or both  can  affect  its
willingness  to  pay. If  higher  GDP  growth  leads  to a significative  increase  in
the  willingness  to  pay, there  will  be an additional  channel  through  which
external  debt  service  payments  may  be increased  in the  medium-term.  Indeed,
this  result  would  suggest  that  a strategy  relying  on debtor  country's  economic
growth  may  be more efficient  than the  implementation  of penalties  for  default.
In short,  this  paper  can  be viewed  as an attempt  to reconcile  (i)  the  recent
theory  of country  risk (see  Gersovitz,  Eaton  and Stiglitz  (1986);  (ii)  the
option  theory  applied  to the  price  of debt  on secondary  market (see  Claessens
and  Van Wijnbergen  (1990),  Cohen (1989)  or Bartolini  and  Dixit (1990)  and
(iii)  empirical  studies  on LDCs creditworthiness.
The  paper  proceeds  as follows.  Section  I  presents  the  analytical
framework  based  on the  option  theory  to assess  the  relationship  between  the
price  of debt  and the  willingness  to  pay of the  debtor  country.  In section  2,
we apply  this  approach  to a sample  of 6 developing  countries.  We present  the
empirical  results  and  discuss  the impact  of debt-reduction  polices  and changes
in interest  rates  on the  price  of debt.  In section  3, we attempt  to identify
empirically  the  principal  factors  which  affect  the  country's  creditworthiness.
Finally,  section  4 contains  our  conclusions.
1.  A Theoretical  Approach  :  A Measure  of the  Willinoness  to Pay
The  borrower's  willingness  to  pay its  external  debt  depends  criticallyon its  beliefs  about  the  lender's  resolve  to penalize  a disruption  of
repayment.  Most  authors  stress  two  forms  of penalties.  First,  the  probability
of default  is related  to the  eventual  loss  of future  access  to capital  markets
(Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981))  Pod, second,  a country  will choose  not to
repudiate  its  debt  only if  the lenders  can  impose  direct  sanctions  such  as the
elimination  of trade  credits  or seizure  of debtor  assets  held in the  creditor
countries  (e.g.  Bulow  and  Rogoff (1989)). The  motivation  for  repayment  is,
therefore,  the  penalties  that  the creditors  are  able  to impose.  If the
implementation  of  penalties  are  clearly  damaging  to the  debtor  country,  the
lenders  may  also  be reticent  to use  their  limited  enforcement  power.  As a
matter  of fact,  the  use of sanctions  suffers  from  a time  consistency  problem 3
4 and,  above  all, the  banks  prefer  some  repayment  as opposed  to none
Fernandez  and  Rosenthal  (1990)  argue  that,  under  these  circumstances,  the
debtor  country  and the  creditors  may  attempt  to renegotiate  the  repayment
stream.
In this  paper,  we assume  that  the  debtor  country  and the  creditors
engage  in such  a bargaining  process.  Both  agents  negotiate  an agreement  on the
amount  that  the  debtor  country  should  pay so that the  lenders  will  not apply
penalties.  The creditors  are likely  to  prefer  this  approach  because  the
implementation  of the  sanctions  will induce  no monetary  gains  and,  eventually,
will  be costly.  Similarly,  the  debtor  country  will  favor  this  payment  because
it is  always  lower  than  the  cost  of the  penalties. In equilibrium,  the  amount
of the  payment  will reflect  the  willingness  to  pay of the  debtor  country  and
according  to this  amount,  the  indebted  country  will  choose  to (i)  repay  its
total  debt, (ii) call  a  partial  default  or (iii)  call  a full  default.  In a
two simple  periods  framework  (current  and  maturity  periods),  we can  write  the
following  equations  :
3  For  example,  creditors  may be enforced  to write  down  the  value  of the
debt  on their  books  to zero  in case  of sanctions.  A result  which  creditor
banks  want to avoid (see  Hellwig (1986)).
4The  seizure  of the debtor  country's  assets  abroad  do not  appear  a
potential  risk  according  to  t"akeman-Linn  (1989).7
no default  if  Xv >  DI
partial  default  if  Di >  X  0  > O
full  default  if  aN  <  0
where  X,  is defined  as the  debtor  country's  willingness  to pay,  D,  the  face
value  of external  debt  at maturity  and 7  the  maturity  period.
These  three  simple  rules  can  be illustrated  as follows.  First,  the
debtor  country  will  reimburse  its  debt  if the  payment  required  to offset  the
penalties  - applied  in case  of default  - is  higher  than  the  debt itself.  The
reimbursement  is less  expensive  than the  required  payment  or the costs  of the
penalties.  Second,  if the  payment  is  positive  but lower  than  the face  value  of
the  debt,  the  country  will  choose  to pay rather  than  to reimburse  totally  its
external  debt.  Thip.  corresponds  to the case  of partial  default  in the  sense
that  the  debtor  country  will only  pay  a fraction  of its  total  debt-service.
The third  possibility  is that  the  willingness  to pay is  negative  or, in other
terms,  the  country  should  receive  money  in  order  to  avoid  a penalty  by its
lenders.  This  may  arise  if the  economic  and  political  benefits  in case  of full
default  are  higher  than  the sanctions  applied  by the lenders.  In this case,
the  debtor  country  will  call  a total  default  on its  external  debt.
The  major  problem  related  of this  approach  is that  the  willingness  to
pay (X4)  is an unobservable  variable.  The  willingness  to  pay depe-nds  on the
bargaining  outcome  between  the  creditors  and  the  debtor  country  which,  as
discussed  by Fernandez  and  Rosenthal  (1990),  is generally  very sensitive  to
the  particular  specifications  of the institutional  structure  in  which  it is
embedded.  As suggested  in the  introduction,  the  idea  in this  paper is to  use
the  information  on the  secondary  market  of the  price  of debt  to obtain  a
measurement  of this  variable.  More precisely,  assuming  that  the  price  of debt
reflects  the  repayment  prospects  of the  borrowers  countries,  we suggest  that
these  prospects  are influenced  to a large  extent  by the  debtor  country's
willingness  to  pay. In continuous  time,  we can  represent  this  assumption  by
the  following  expression:8
(1)  Vt = Dt[p(X,  >  D,)]  +  exp(-r)B(X,  1  ocx,  - DO)
where  Vt  is the  market  value  of the  debt  on the secondary  market,  t the
current  period,  r the  actualization  rate,  i  the  maturity  of the  external  debt,
and 1 the  function  which  equals  one  over the  interval  0 and  D,  and 0
elsewhere.  The  price  of debt is therefore  defined  as the  probability  Vt/Dt.
Equation  (1)  states  that  the  market  value  of the  debt  on the secondary
market  is the  expected  value  of the  futuxe  repayments.  The  market  value  equals
the  value  of a contingent  clamn  where  the  willingness  to  pay (X,)  is the
underlying  asset.  The debtor  country  examines  continuously  the  possibility  to
call  a default  according  to the  value  of its  potential  payments  and  the  value
of the  variable  X,.  While  the  first  term  in  parenthesis  is the  probability
that  the  debtor  country  will reimburse  its  debt  on the current  period,  the
second  term  illustrates  the  probability  that  the  debtor  country  will call  a
partial  default.  We do not  write  the  probability  of full  default  because,  in
this case,  the  payment  will  be equal  to 0. However,  unlike  most  authors  using
the  option  theory,  we consider  the  possibility  that  the  debtor  country  may
call  a total  default  on its  external  debt 5.
Let  us assume  that  the  willingness  to  pay is a random  variable  that
fluctuates  over time  in a stochastic  manner 6. Moreover,  for  analytical
simplici:y,  we suppose  the  process  depends  on a  Brownian  motion
(2)  dXt = gdt +  adz
5For  example,  Claessens  and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1990)  or Bartolini  and  Dixit
(1990)  consider  that  the  payment  of the  country  depends  on its  foreign
exchange  availability.  In such  case,  these  authors  only  assume  a  partial
default.
6  In recent  papers,  the  price  of debt is  assumed  to follow  a Brownian
motion.  But, since  the secondary  market  is relatively  thin,  the  price  of debt
is likely  to  be influenced  by exogenous  shocks  (e.g.  changes  in LIBOR)  and  has
no tendency  to revert  to a long-run  average.  We consider  more realistic  the
assumption  that  the  debtor  country's  willingness  to pay is  a Brownian  motion
because  the  effects  of such shocks  is controlled  for.9
where (Zt)teR  a Brownian motion, u  the drift and a the volatility of the
process. Note that this process includes the prospect that the variable Xt can
be negative as discussed above.
Given equation  (2)  and after some manipulations, we can rewrite equation
(1)  as7 :
(3)  Vt =  Dt  +  a4rexp(-rT) [aON(aO)  -ajN(a 1)  +
(/ 1 /2w) (exp(-ao 2/2)  - exp(-a 1
2/2)]
with a1 C  (Dtexp(rr)  - Xt - UT]  /  (al  r)
ao  5  [-  Xt  - / 7I/  (a; r)
D"  =  Dtexp(r(T-t))
h
and  N(h)  f  (1/127)exp(-y2/2)  dy
To the extent that the market value of the external debt is observable
on the secondary market, equation (3)  can be used in principle to determine
the implicit value of the variable Xt. The problem is that, simultaneously,
the volatility  (a)  and the drift (A)  which characterize the process followed
by this variable are also unknown. In order to solve this difficulty, we
propose to follow an iterative approach which will be described in the next
section.
Equation  (3)  identifies explicitly the factors driving the price of debt
on the secondary market  :  the willingness to pay Xt, the actualization rate
7  The model can be applied to different maturities, e.g. short and long
term debts. If the short term debt does not affect the probability of
repayment of the long term debt at maturity, the market value of the debt is
simply the sum of the market value of the short-term debt and of the long-term
debt. The analysis can be extended to debt with n different maturities. By
contrast, if the short -term debt influences the repayment prospect of the
long-term debt, we should use bivariate or trivariate normal random variables
approaches.10
rt,  the maturity  T  and the volume of debt Dt.  The response of the market value
of the debt to a variation in these variables can be examined using the above
equation. For instance, an increase in Xt or in the drift A  will affect
positively the market value of the debt. We will discuss more precisely on the
sensitivity of the price of debt to changes in these factors in the empirical
part of the paper. Rather, we prefer to focus on the impact of a debt-
reduction policy on the price of debt, since this issue is extensively
discussed in the recent literature related to the Brady Plan.
Differentiating equation  (3),  the effect of a change in the stock of
external debt on the price of debt is the following:
8(Vt/Dt)  (-Vt  +  Dt (1  +  N(ao)  - N(al)  1
(4)  >  or < 0
5Dt  D2t
The uncertainty about the sign of equation (4)  reflects the opposing
views which currently exist in the literature. For some authors, a debt relief
includes a risk in the sense that the debtor may perceive this policy as a
reward  (see  Corden, 1988), but according to others it may also facilitate the
adjustment process of the debtor country (e.g  Sachs, 1987). Equation  (4)
emphasizes that the impact of a variation in the stock of debt on the price of
debt depends on some specific factors. Interestingly, the impact of a debt-
relief is influenced by the volume of the external debt. The higher the stock
of debt the more probable a debt-reduction will induce an increase in the
price of debt, suggesting that the "debt overhang" is more likely to be
reduced if the existing debt is large 8. Also, a debt-reduction will generally
raise the price of debt if the willingness to pay is high.  Recently, Diwan
and Rodrik  (1991)  argue that the central inefficiency created by the debt
crisis is that the debtor countries cannot attract loans from new groups of
creditors. A debt-reduction operation might be successful if it relaxes this
liquidity constraint. But this supposes that the debtor country 's
8The  "debt overhang" is defined by Krugman (1987)  as  "  the presence of
an existing, inherited debt sufficiently large that creditors do not expect to
be fully repaid".11
creditworthiness  is  high  enough  to  attract  new  financing.
Finally,  given  that  the  parameters  of the  stochastic  process  followed  by
the  variable  Xt  are determined  without  any  a  priori  assumption,  it is
interesting  to test the  capacity  of prediction  of the  model.  The expected
value  of  X  in  period  t' can  be expressed  as:
(5) E(Xt.)  - Xt  +  ST  where T a  t'- t and t' >  t
Using  the  Taylor  formula  of the  second  order,  the  expected  value  of the
market  value  of the  debt in  period  t' can  be approximated  as
(6)  E(Vt,)  - Dt.+  o  rexp  (-r7)  [a'ON(a'O)  - a' 1N(a' 1) +
(1/r2r)  (exp(-a' 0
2 /2)  - exp(-a' 1
2 /2)]  +
exp(-rv)/(2/Twv)  (exp(-a' 0
2/2) - exp(-a' 1
2/2))  (CT)
with  a'1 a  CDtiexp(r7)  - E(Xt,)  - pil/  (Orr)
alo  =  t-B(Xts)  - pi1l/  (t-7)
Equation  (6)  indicates  the  expected  value  of the  market  value  of the
debt  and, therefore,  the  price  of debt.
2. An  EmRirical  Test  E  Estimates  and  Simulations  for  6 Highly  Indebted
Countries
The  approach  developed  in the  previous  section,  explicitly  designed  for
empirical  testing,  is applied  to  six  highly  indebted  countries  - Argentina,
Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico  Poland  and  Venezuela  - over the  1986:IV-90:IV  period.
The data  on the  maturity  (i),  the  interest  rate (rt)  and  the  volume  of debt
(Dt)  has  been furnished  by the  Quarterly  Review  published  by the  Debt and
International  Finance  Division  of the  World  Bank.  We also  used  the  data
published  by Salomon  Brothers  for  the  price  of debt.  Note that  we defined  the12
interest  rate  as the  six-month  Libor 9, the  maturity (7)  as an average  between
the  maturities  of short-term  and long  term  external  debt  and  the  volume  of
external  debt  as the  total  claims  of commercial  banks.
As mentioned  in Section  1, if equation  (3)  can  be used to derive  the
debtor  country's  willingness  to  pay (Xt),  the  difficulty  is  that the  drift  and
the  volatility  of the  process  followed  by this  variable  are also  unknown.
Recently,  in order  to solve  this  problem,  Borensztein  and Pennachi  (1990)  have
proposed  to express  the  volatility  of Xt  as a function  of the  instantaneous
volatility  of the  price  of debt.  Their  approach  is however  difficult  to
implement  empirically  since  the instantaneous  volatility  of the  price  of debt
is  unobservable  and  cannot  be considered  constant  over  a period  of time 10 and
the  drift  of the  state  variable  (A)  is  not  explicitly  determined 11. In such
case,  we prefer  to  use an alternative  method  which  can  be described  as
follows 12 .
For  a given  country,  we selected  two  arbitral  initial  values  for  the
volatility  and the  drift.  Under  these  conditions,  we derived  implicitly  the
values  of Xt  over a  period  of time  using  equation  (3):  X1, X2 ,  . . .Xn  where  n is
9  By using  the  six-month  Libor,  we implicitly  assume  that  the  risk
premium  associated  to the  purchase  of external  debt  assets  on the  secondary
market  is equal  to 0.
10However,  these  two  authors  assume  in  their  empirical  work  that  this
parameter  is constant  over sampling  periods  when,  in fact,  it  was changing.
11  In their  empirical  test,  Borensztein  and  Pennachi  assume  that  the
value  of the  drift  ranges  from  0 to 0.09.  According  to these  authors,  the
first  value  "implies  that  the  expected  rate  of change  of the  state  variable
equals  the  expected  rate  of return  on a  marketable  asset  with  the  same  risk",
and  the  second  value  is an approximation  for  the case  in  which "the  expected
rate  of growth  of the state  variable  is zero" (p.814).
12  Several  approaches  can  be proposed  in order  to determine  empirically
the  drift  and  the  volatility  of the  process  followed  by the  willingness  to
pay.  For instance,  the  drift  could  be approximated  by average  GDP growth  or
the  openness  of the  debtor  country's  economy  over the  period  since  these
factors  might  be correlated  to the  average  willingness  to pay  as suggested  by
some  authors (e.g.  Diwan (1990)).13
the number of observations. Given these estimated values, we calculated a new
value for the drift (A  &  E6Xt/6t)  and for the volatility  (o2  . E(6Xt-
A6t)/6t)  which can be compared to their initial values. To the extent that
the initial and final values do not differ the process was stopped. In the
opposite case, we started again the process with new initial values. While
this iterative methodology is not entirely defensible 13,  it presents the main
advantage to determine the values of Xt, the drift and the volatility without
any a priori assumption on the variables which can influence the stochastic
process.
Table 1 summarizes our main findings. Note that the values of the
willingness to pay (in  US$ billion) over the observation period are presented
in Annex I. The drift (A)  and the volatility  (a)  indicate the characteristic
of the process followed by the willingness to pay over the 1986-90 period for
each country of our sample. The parameter S shows the correlation between the
price of debt and the willingness to pay over the observation period.  We also
present the probability of full default  (po)  and the probability of partial
default  (pl)  for each country. In order to test the model out of sample, the
expected price of debt for the first quarter of 1991 (EPt+l)  is  compared to
the observed value (Pt+l).  Finally, as an illustration, we present the impact
of a 10* debt-relief on the expected price of debt (E(Pt+1)*).
The results indicate that the willingness to pay were quite volatile in
all countries during the last four years. This reflects the unstable
conditions which existed and continue to exist in most of the highly indebted
countries. The parameter S  shows that the changes in the values of the
country's creditworthiness are different from the variations in the price of
debt. This results from the influence of the average maturity, the interest
rate, the drift and the volatility on the price of debt. Interestingly, the
probability of full default appears higher in Argentina, Poland and Venezuela
13In  particular, we do not provide an analytical solution. Moreover, as
the existence of multiple solutions cannot be a priori rejected, we needed to
test the iterative method for a large range of initial values. Fortunately, we
did not find any multiple solutions.14
than in Mexico, Chile and Brazil. The recent favorable economic results of
Mexico and Chile explain the highest creditworthiness of these two countries.
In the case of Brazil, while the probability of full default is relatively
low, the probability of partial default seems high. Because the Brazil's stock
of debt is very important, it is unlikely that this country will call a total
default on its debt in spite of its poor economic performance. Also, we tried
to examine how well the model works out of sample to test its robustness.
Using equation  (6)  we calculated the expected value of the price of debt for
the first quarter of 1991. r,ne  results are encouraging in the sense that the
difference between both values of the price of debt are in general small. The
impact of a 10 percent debt-reduction has also been examined for our sample of
highly indebted countries. If the impact of such policy was ambiguous in the
theoretical model, all simulation results indicate that the effect of a
decline in the stock of external debt .?ould  increase the price of debt on the
secondary market.
Finally, the short-run sensitivity of the price of debt to changes in
the rate of interest rate and in maturity can also be examined. As an
illustration, we present the results in the case of Argentina assuming that
the initial price of debt was US$ 0.216 in all simulations. First, a two years
increase in the maturity leads to a decline in the price of debt from US$
0.216 to US$ 0.165. This reflects the fact that the willingness to pay will
decrease over time because the drift is negative in the case of Argentina.
Second, the price of debt is positively influenced by a decline in the rate of
interest. As a matter of fact, a reduction in the interest rate of one percent
would increase the price of debt to US$ 0.23.  The dramatic decline in the
Libor rate explains to a large extent the higher prices of debt observed on
the secondary market since the beginning of 1991.
3. The determinants of willinqness to Day
In the previous section, we emphasized the impact of changes in the
volume of debt, in average maturity and in the interest rate on the price of
debt. This analysis shed light on the implications of debt-reduction programs15
(which  the  above  variables  are the  essential  components)  on the  probability  of
payment  of the  debtor  country.  But this  probability  may  be influenced  by some
additional  factors.  The  purpose  in this  section  is to determine  the  economic
and  political  variables  which  can  affect  the  changes  in the  willingness  to pay
and,  consequently,  in the  price  of debt.  The  procedure  used in this  paper
differs  from  other  studies  in that the  dependent  variable  is the  willingness
to pay  rather  than the  price  of debt.  Using  the  willingness  to pay, the
sensitivity  of the  risk  of default  to changes  in the  volatility,  the  average
maturity  and  the  interest  rates  is controlled  for, implying  more reliable
tests  of the  impact  of external  factors 14. In other  words,  we assume  that  the
price  of debt  is indirectly  influenced  by some  factors  through  their  impact  on
the  willingness  to  pay. Note that  we define  the  willingness  to  pay  per dollar
of external  debt (Xt/Dt)  as the  dependant  variable.  Our  estimated  results  can
be compared  with other  studies  which  used the  price  of debt  as the  dependant
variable  (e.g Boehmer  and  Megginson (1990)).
The  responsiveness  of the  willingness  to  pay (per  dollar  of external
debt)  to three  classes  of factors  has  been  estimated.  First,  we tested  the
hypothesis  that  the  willingness  to pay  are influenced  by the  debtor  country's
capacity  to  pay. Identification  of such  domestic  influences,  if any,  on the
willingness  to  pay  may confirm  that  debtor  countries  economic  situation  is
partly  reflected  in the  price  of debt.  We used  the  economic  characteristics  of
borrowers  which  have  been  employed  in a  wide range  of empirical  studies
concerning  develcAing  country  debt  and the  price  of debt.  These  variables  are:
GDP,  GDP  growth,  exports,  imports,  variation  in reserves,  inflation,  and  the
degree  of openness  of the  country.  Second,  as recently  suggested  by Stone
(1991),  the impact  of particular  events  on the  willingness  to pay  may  be
14More broadly,  this  approach  can  be  compared  to  the  studies  which  (i)
examined  the  characteristics  of  debtor  countries  which  presage  rescheduling  of
their  debt  and  (ii)  the  determinants  of  the  interest  premium  (spread)  charged
on  LDC loans  by  international  commercial  banks.  But,  these  two  approaches  have
been  extensively  criticized  since  both rescheduling  and  the spread  above  the
LIBOR  cannot  be considered  as good  proxies  of the  probability  of default  of
the  debtor  country.  "The  fundamental  difficulty  with  these  models  is defining
appropriately  the  dependant  variable,  the  occurrence  of a debt  problem"
(Gersovitz,  Eaton  and Stiglitz  (1986),  p.506).16
significant since the number of potential buyers and sellers are small in the
secondary market. In order to test this hypothesis, we examine the effects of
the increase in commercial bank loan reserves in mid-1987 and the announcement
of the Brady Plan in March 1989. Third, since the economic conditions existing
in the creditor country can influence the bargaining process between the
debtor and the creditors, we estimated the impact of changes in  US industrial
production index on the willingness to pay of the debtor country.
The impact of the above factors on the willingness to pay was estimated
using pooled cross-section time-series data for 6 countries described in
Section 2 over the 1986:4 - 1990:4 period.  We used the typical random-effect
error components equations since simply pooling the data and estimating by an
ordinary least squares procedure can result in inefficiency as well as several
sorts of biases due to heterogeneity of coefficients across countries and time
15 The data was obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics
and from various national sources. For some countries, because quarterly data
on GDP was not available, we used the Industrial Index.
The estimated results are summarized in Table 2. On the whole, the
results appear quite robust. The most interesting aspect of these results
concerns the positive impact of changes in the debtor country's capacity of
payment on the willingness to pay. Indeed, an increase in GDP or GDP growth
appear to influence positively the dependant variable. This result seems to
indicate that GDP and GDP growth are good indicators of the willingness to
pay. Similarly, an increase in the change of international reserves and in
exports leads to an improvement of the debtor country willingness to pay.
Note, however, that the impact of a change in reserves is positive but not
statistically significant in most regressions.  As suggested by several
authors  (e.g.  Divan (1990)),  a higher degree of openness of the debtor
country  (measured  as the ratio of imports and exports over GDP) leads to an
15  The fixed-effect error component model and regressions for individual
countries were also tested. Overall, the results were not qualitively very
different from those presented in Table 2. Note, however, that the degree of
freedom is low for individual regressions. These results can be obtained from
the authors upon request.17
increase  in the  willingness  to pay. In such  a case,  the  creditor  can  use a
larger  range  of sanctions  in  case  of non-payment.
The  results  pertaining  to the  other  variables  also  deserves  a brief
explanation.  The impact  of  Brady  Plan  announcement  in  March 1989  exerted  a
positive  and significative  impact  on the  debtor  countries  willingness  to  pay.
As the  eventual  participation  in a debt-reduc'tion  operation  was  reserved  to
countries  with  satisfying  results,  such  anno-L2cement  increased  the  debtor
countries  willingness  to pay.  As expected,  the  impact  of the  increase  in loan
reserves  of commercial  banks  in  mid-1987  was negative  on the  willingness  to
pay. Such  increase  in  reserves  is likely  to reduce  the  probability  to be
penalized  in case  of partial  payments.  Finally,  the  willingness  to  pay appears
to be sensitive  to changes  in  US aggregates  and  in  particular  to the  US
industrial  production  index.  The  estimated  negative  parameter  associated  to
this  variable  indicates  that  an improvement  in the  US economy  can  ameliorate
the  commercial  banks  position,  thereby  reducing  the  penalties  associated  to
default  on LDCs external  debt.
4. Conclusion
We  proposed  in this  paper  a new  theoretical  approach  in order  to
determine  the  debtor  country's  willingness  to pay  and  hence  the  price  of debt
on the  secondary  market  of  highly  indebted  countries.  We assumed  that the
market  value  of the  debt can  be viewed  as an option  where  the  country  examines
the alternative  to pay  according  to the  values  of its  potential  payments  and
its  willingness  to pay.  Using  the  option-pricing  theory,  we measured  the
willingness  to  pay of six  highly  indebted  countries  over the  last  five  years
without  any  a priori  assumption  regarding  the  factors  which  can  influence  this
variable.  Since  the  drift  and the  volatility  of the  willingness  to  pay have
been identified,  the  model  was  used to determine  the  future  price  of debt.  The
comparison  between  the  observed  and the  estimated  price  of debt for  the  first
quarter  of 1991  indicates  that  the  model  predicted  relatively  well the  future
price  of the  debt.  The sensitivity  of the  price  of debt  to changes  in the
volume  of debt,  the  average  maturity  and the  interest  rate  was  also  examined.18
This  exercise  shed  light  on the  eventual  implications  of debt-reduction
operations  on the  price  of debt.  Finally,  we attempted  to determine
empirically  the influence  of various  factors  on the  willingness  to  pay. We
emphasized  that  indicators  of tls  debtor  country's  capacity  of payment  and
particular  events  such  as an increase  in commercial  banks  loan  reserves  can
influence  significantly  the  willingness  to  pay and,  consequently,  the  price  of
debt.
Although  the  approach  presented  in  this  paper  can  be extended  in  various
ways - e.g.  a stochastic  interest  rate can  be introduced  or different  classes
of debt  should  be distinguished  according  to their  maturities  - the  policy
implications  of the  exercise  are  straightforward.
(1) A debt-reduction  operation  is likely  to influence  positively  the  price  of
debt  on the secondary  market. Specifically,  the  model  demonstrates  that  this
positive  impact  is closely  related  to the initial  levels  of debt  and  of the
wilingness  to pay of the  debtor  country. While  the first  point  indicates  that
the "debt  overhang"  is  more likely  to be reduced  if the  existing  debt is
large,  the  second  suggests  that  the  benefit  of a debt-reduction  operation  will
be greater  whether  the  debtor  country's  willingness  is  high enough  to attract
new  financing.
(2)  An increase  in  GDP  of the  debtor  country  may  exert  a significative
impact  on the  its  willingness  to  pay external  debt.  An improvement  in economic
conditions  of the  debtor  country  can  therefore  enhance  payments  of interest  on
external  debt.  This  suggests  that  a strategy  relying  on debtor  country's
economic  growth  may  be more efficient  than  the  implementation  of penalties  for
default.
(3)  Changes  in creditor's  behavior  may  affect  the  debtor  country's  willingness
to  pay. While  the  Brady  announcement  produced  a favorable  impact  on the
willingness  to pay, the  influence  of announcements  regarding  loans  reserves  by
commercial  banks  was  negative.19
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Table  1:
Main  Indicators
Country  ARGENTINA  BRAZIL  CHILE  MEXICO  POLAND  VENEZUELA
AM*)  -10.2  -5.8  -0.3  -5.00  -15.4  -3.51
or  (%)  27.5  24.0  34.4  34.8  35.9  19.27
9  0.874  0.394  0.774  0.434  0.950  0.919
Po  (W)  61.8  39.4  11.7  30.9  58.6  63.2
Pi  (96)  93.8  97.9  43.8  71.7  98.5  76.7
B(Pt+i)  21.6  23.3  74.0  45.9  15.8  53.4
Pto1  18.7  27.7  76.0  47.3  19.73  54.8
B  (p+l)  23.0  25.57  75.7  48.1  17.3  55.4
Note  : p  =  drift  of  the  willingness  to  pay,  a =  the  volatility  of  the  willingness  to  pay,  B  the  correlation
between  the  price  and  the  willingness  to  pay,  PO  =  the  probability  of  full  default,  PI  =  the  probability  of  full
and  partial  default,  E(P,+z)  =  the  expected  price  of  debt  for  the  first  quarter  of  1991,  P,+. the  observed  price  of
debt  for  the  first  quarter  of  1991  and  (EP,+)  =  the  expected  price  of  debt  assuming  a  debt-reduction  of  10t for
the  first  quarter  of  1991.21
Table  2:
Estimates  (1986:4  - 1990:4)
The  Determinants  of Willincaness to Pav
(t-statistics  in parenthesis)
Independent  Variables  Equations
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
constant  0.140  0.131  0.161  0.174  0.159
(4.49)  (4.40)  (4.62)  (5.12)  (5.63)
(variation  in  0.131  10-3  0.101  10-  0.142  10-  0.08  10  0.860  104
reserves)/GDP  (1.47)  (1.14)  (1.53)  (0.83)  (1.04)
GDP  0.151  10-2  0.143  10-2  0.135  10-2  0.151  10-2
(4.31)  (4.19)  (3.57)  (4.68)
GDP  growth  0.096
(1.51)
exports/GDP  0.671  10-  0.684  10-3  0.170  10-
(2.22)  (2.33)  (0.59)
U.S.  Industrial  -0.327  1042  -0.311  10-2  -0.339  10-2  -0.233  10-2  -0.417  10-2
index  (-4.36)  (-4.15)  (-4.31)  (-3.03)  (-5.39)




Brady  Announcement  0.191  lo-
(2.09)
Reserves  Announcement  -0.357  10.
(-2.82)
SSR  0.089  0.089  0.092  0.106  0.076Annex
The  Evolution  of the  Willingness  to  Pay,  1986:4-1990:4
In US$  Million
Dates  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Poland  Venezuela
1986.4  87.42  184.86  18.04  103.89  12.91  40.13
1987.1  93.76  163.58  18.96  113.89  13.44  43.76
1987.2  84.26  154.51  20.85  132.75  13.53  46.66
1987.3  74.78  112.85  13.32  91.88  13.18  36.65
1987.4  86.45  129.40  17.57  139.25  14.31  44.04
1988.1  71.09  131.01  14.76  111.28  13.89  36.94
1988.2  66.99  145.91  17.11  118.36  13.44  38.39
1988.3  69.83  157.82  17.53  126.42  12.67  36.96
1988.4  69.83  161.96  15.67  112.58  12.04  32.28
1989.1  65.13  145.59  16.14  108.11  11.60  28.95
1989.2  54.47  153.03  17.43  105.63  12.45  31.51
1989.3  60.24  132.09  14.96  96.05  12.11  30.63
1989.4  43.64  102.34  12.81  74.56  6.55  25.32
1990.1  34.32  120.55  15.45  65.03  5.02  27.24
1990.2  34.32  108.66  14.35  73.20  5.80  31.22
1990.3  36.26  101.59  16.15  63.88  5.70  30.09
1990.4  52.06  105.16  18.28  71.25  6.24  39.10Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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